Showing posts with label ICS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ICS. Show all posts

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Security & Hacking: Malware & US Power Plants

Summation by Reuters http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/01/16/cyber-security-powerplants-virus-idINDEE90F0H720130116 of this ICS CERT Monthly Monitor (PDF) http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Oct-Dec2012.pdf

I strongly suggest reading the PDF if you want to learn or understand the issue.

One of the things I noted on my first read of the PDF, was that not only was the one plant hit by Malware, but that two of their workstations that were critical to the operation of the plant had no backups, or even backup components on site.

This hints at the rather large scope of the problem for improving ICS security.

I don't have a background in ICS or Power Plants, my experience is more in physical security, but the impression I got from the ICS CERT Monthly Monitor was that many (most?) of these plants are used to winging things.

They are used to enough slack, or excess capacity, in the system or grid as a whole, that they haven't had to meet the type of uptime requirements many in IT fields take for granted.

If I understood correctly, a simple HDD or power supply failure of one of the critical workstations could have deadlined the whole plant for indefinite period.

Further Resources from US CERT Control Systems Security Program (CSSP):

Thursday, December 13, 2012

Security & Hacking: "Unauthorized Access to a New Jersey Company’s Industrial Control System"

http://publicintelligence.net/fbi-antisec-ics/

Some snippets of interest:

"US Business 1 had a controller for the system that was password protected, but was set up for remote/Internet access. By using the link posted by the hacktivist, the published backdoor URL provided the same level of access to the company’s control system as the password-protected administrator login. The backdoor required no password and allowed direct access to the control system."

"The URL that linked to the control system of US Business 1 provided access to a Graphical User Interface (GUI), which provided a floor plan layout of the office, with control fields and feedback for each office and shop area. All areas of the office were clearly labeled with employee names or area names."

As a gamer, I'll note the second snippet matches up with some games, which seems amusing, sad, and ironic to me.

As someone with much deeper background in physical security than computer security, I'll also note that the second snippet above would provide a lot of very useful intel for physical attacks and/or social engineering.

IMHO Social Engineering attacks are on a boundary of Physical & Computer Security, walking in and pretending to be there to fix something is certainly a Physical attack, though you might be placing a physical keylogger or other Pen Testing equipment to attack the computer network.
 

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Security & Hacking: 2012 ICS Cyber Security Conference & Aurora

http://community.controlglobal.com/content/are-utilities-and-others-still-blinded-real-threat-aurora

You should read and follow that blog if your interested in Security, Hacking, ICS issues, etc.

Snipped from link above [I changed format slightly from original, words are the same]:
"Protective relays are not as secure as NERC or others would have you believe. Protective relays are not just used in electric substations but also protect large electric equipment in many industries. "